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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Cumberland Gap Tunnel is a twin bore tunnel on U.S. 25 E located in the Cumberland Gap
National Historical Park. The facility carries a four-lane highway through the Cumberland
Mountains between Kentucky and Tennessee. The Tunnel was opened to traffic in October
1996. The original facility included some ITS components, such as: closed-circuit television
(CCTV), message signs, magnetic loop detectors, and a traffic control system.
In 1999, Congress provided Highway Trust Funds to upgrade the ITS components and deploy
new technologies at the Cumberland Gap Tunnel. The Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) and Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) partnered to improve traveler mobility
along the U.S. 25E corridor through the Cumberland Gap region. The funding was used to
develop an ITS regional architecture, strategic plan, and integration plan, and to deploy and
upgrade ITS technologies at and around the Tunnel.
As planning of the project got underway, a technical advisory committee (TAC) was established
to provide guidance and oversight for the planning of the ITS deployment. The TAC consisted
of representatives from: KYTC, Tennessee Department of transportation (TDOT), FHWA,
Cumberland Gap National Historical Park, Cumberland Gap Tunnel Authority (CGTA), and the
Cumberland Valley Area Development District. After significant delays through the
procurement process, a private consultant with valuable related experience was hired to lead the
planning process and complete the regional ITS architecture, strategic plan, and integration plan.
The planning process and documentation cost $818,936.
Stakeholders were engaged at local workshops to help identify local and regional needs. A local
project champion, Mr. Lewis Melton, P.E., was identified who served as the information liaison
between the stakeholders and the general public. Mr. Melton was involved in the original
construction and operation of the Tunnel and was able to provide much information during the
planning process. Several legal agreements were put in place throughout the duration of the
project that helped to solidify the partnerships and ensure long-lasting relationships.
KYTC identified a project manager who had prior experience with ITS deployment projects.
Leveraging this past experience, the project manager pursued a single system integrator for the
CGT ITS deployment. The procurement process for the deployment was lengthy and
experienced many delays.
The ITS deployment cost more than $4.8 million dollars and included the following: 1)
expansion and upgrade of the CCTV system and upgrade of the multiplexer; 2) installation of the
radio rebroadcast system; 3) design and upgrade of the local dynamic message signs (DMS); 4)
regional deployment of DMS and CCTV for I-75 and I-81; and 5) upgrade of the tunnel facility
control room. Installation of these systems occurred in phases between July of 2002 and
September of 2007.
The goals of the deployment were to: 1) provide updated traveler information; 2) improve
integration of the tunnel systems; and 3) improve incident detection, verification, and response
1

times along U.S. 25E. It was also expected that this deployment would meet other general ITS
goals area such as: traveler safety, traveler mobility, transportation system efficiency, and
conservation of energy and protection of the environment.
The purpose of this local evaluation report is to provide documentation on the planning and
installation of the ITS components and to determine how well the deployment met the intended
goals. This evaluation involved the review of project documentation, interview of stakeholders,
and analysis of additional data that would serve as measures of effectiveness. This evaluation
focused on whether the ITS deployment met the following objectives:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Provide Up-to-Date Traveler Information to Local and Regional Travelers
Improve Integration of the Tunnel Systems
Improve Incident Detection, Verification, and Response Times
Improve Traveler Safety
Improve Traveler Mobility
Improve Transportation System Efficiency
Conserve Energy and Protect the Environment

Based upon the goals of the deployment and the ITS goal areas, the following hypotheses were
established for the evaluation:
H1.
H2.
H3.
H4.

H5.

H6.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would facilitate the
passage of increased traffic through the tunnel corridor.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would improve safety
around the Tunnel by reducing rear end collisions during hazardous material escorts.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would improve the
operations and maintenance procedures within the Tunnel.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would facilitate an
increase in the average number of hazardous material vehicles per escort through the
CGT.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would provide a
mechanism to enhance traffic and weather information to travelers in the region
surrounding CGT.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would help personnel to
detect, verify, and respond to incidents in and around the Tunnel more quickly.

Based on interviews of the stakeholders, the ITS deployment served to provide additional
information in the control room which allowed for improved traffic flow and improved safety at
the Tunnel. The equipment also provided improvements in traveler information both locally and
regionally. The upgrade of the equipment led to efficiency in operations and maintenance since
there were fewer technical and integration problems.
Additional measures of effectiveness were analyzed to determine if these stakeholder findings
could be substantiated with quantitative data. Traffic volume data was unreliable and spotty and
therefore could not be used to make any conclusions about the deployment. Data did show a
significant increase in hazardous material vehicles through the Tunnel (from 2000-2001 to 20072

2008) which could be an indication of increased traffic through the Tunnel. The information on
hazardous material vehicles also showed that the average number of vehicles escorted per
closure had increased from 1.27 to 1.41. Crash data indicated a reduction in crashes when
comparing the four years before and the four years after the implementation of ITS.
Based on the findings, the deployment met most of the objectives that were established,
including the improvement of: traveler information; integration of systems; incident detection,
verification, and response time; traveler safety and mobility, and transportation system
efficiency. All of the identified hypotheses were found to be either fully or partially true.
Technical and institutional issues were also identified as part of the evaluation. Those issues
included such things as: lack of expertise; difficult and lengthy procurement processes; and lack
of traffic volume data.
The evaluation found that the ITS deployment at the CGT was a successful demonstration of the
usefulness of ITS technologies. The stakeholders were pleased with the deployment and found
value in the technology. The key lessons learned and recommendations for future ITS
deployments include:









Engage Stakeholders – Local and regional stakeholders should be engaged early in the
project.
Identify a Project Champion – A local project champion should be identified who is
committed to seeing the project succeed and can assist with engaging and communicating
with stakeholders.
Plan for the Project – Set aside proper funding to plan for the project, making sure to
establish clear goals and performance measures for the project.
Establish Institutional Agreements – Formal partnership agreements should be
established in an effort to garner long-term commitment to the project.
Find Expertise Within – A project manager who has significant experience with ITS
deployment should be chosen for the project.
Find Expertise Outside – ITS deployment projects can be very technical and
complicated. If expertise is not available within the organization, the proper expertise
should be obtained from consultants or other outside organizations.
Prepare for a Lengthy Procurement Process – Prepare stakeholders for a lengthy
procurement and investigate procurement options at the start of the project.
Utilize a System Integrator for the Duration of the Project – Make use of a system
integrator to ensure that accountability rests with a single firm and with that firm’s
subcontractors.

In addition, a recommendation specific to the Tunnel is the implementation of traffic count
systems. This would allow stakeholders to measure the flow of traffic through and around the
Tunnel and would provide valuable data to the stakeholders.

3
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of the Project
This study provides an evaluation of the Cumberland Gap Tunnel (CGT) Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS) deployment along the U.S. 25E Corridor from I-81 near
Morristown, Tennessee to I-75 near Corbin, Kentucky. This report reviews the activities
undertaken for determining the necessary components for installation, documents the technical
and institutional issues encountered throughout the project, and identifies the best practices and
recommendations that resulted from these activities. This evaluation is intended to assess how
well the ITS components performed in meeting the goals established at the onset of the
deployment. This documentation of activities, lessons learned, best practices, and
recommendations will provide valuable information to the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
(KYTC) when faced with similar projects in the future. The information contained in this report
will also be useful to other states that are considering similar types of projects.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this evaluation was to provide a clear understanding of the value, effectiveness,
and impact of the ITS deployment at the Cumberland Gap Tunnel. The results of the evaluation
will have implication for future ITS deployments and will also provide valuable information to
the transportation community.
1.3 Methodology
The information for this evaluation was collected using two mechanisms: (1) an extensive
review of project documentation and (2) interviews with key players involved throughout the
implementation process. The research team developed the evaluation plan for this project by
combining the specific evaluation goals (provided in the original partnership agreement
between the Federal Highway Administration and KYTC) and a sample evaluation plan
provided by the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), the official
coordinator of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s research programs. Recommendations
and lessons learned were developed based on findings of the evaluation.
1.4 Structure of the Report
This report is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the evaluation
including the objective of the project and the methodology utilized to accomplish the objective.
Chapter 2 provides some background on the CGT facility, the planning and funding for the ITS
upgrade, stakeholder involvement, and institutional agreements. Chapter 3 provides
information on the evaluation plan, including the purpose, objectives, and hypotheses. Chapter
4 provides detailed information about the planning, procurement, and deployment of ITS at the
CGT. Chapter 5 summarizes the project outcomes, including a discussion of technical and
institutional issues. Chapter 6 discusses the lessons learned from this ITS deployment project.

5
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ER TWO: BACKGRO
B
OUND ON THE
T
CUMB
BERLAND GAP TUNN
NEL
CHAPTE
2.1

The
T Cumberrland Gap Tunnel
T
Facility

T facility carrries a four-laane highway
y under the C
Cumberland Mountains bbetween
The CGT
Kentucky
y and Tennessee. The tu
unnel facility
y consists off office, operrational, andd control areaas,
as well as twin bores carrying traaffic on U.S. 25E betweeen Kentuckyy and Tennesssee. The
facility liies within the Cumberlan
nd Gap National Histori cal Park locaated in the trri-state area of
Kentucky
y, Tennesseee, and Virgin
nia. The hig
ghway portioon of each boore includes two traffic
lanes and
d a limited sh
houlder. Fig
gure 1 showss the Kentuccky portal loooking south on U.S. 25E
E.

Figure 1. Cumberland Gap Tunnel - A View of th
he Kentucky P
Portal

When thee Tunnel opeened for trafffic in Octob
ber 1996, thee tunnel facillity had statee-of-the-art
ventilatio
on, lighting, and communications eq
quipment. Thhe Tunnel allso includedd several ITS
S
devices, such as closed-circuit television (CC
CTV) cameraas, several m
message signns, and magnnetic
C contractedd with Tunneel Management, Inc. (TM
MI)
loop deteectors for traaffic surveillaance. KYTC
to provid
de managemeent and operrations of thee facility.
2.2

Funding
F
and
d Planning for
f the ITS Upgrade
U
an
nd Deploym
ment

In 1999, the Cumberland Gap reg
gion was sellected to partticipate in thhe ITS Integrration
componeent of the ITS
S Deploymeent Program as designateed through thhe U.S. Depaartment of
Transporrtation’s Fisccal Year 199
99 Appropriaations Bill. F
Funding wass provided thhrough the ITS
Deploym
ment Program
m as defined in Section 5208
5
of the T
Transportatioon Equity Act for the 21st
Century (TEA-21).
(
The
T U.S. Co
ongress proviided Highwaay Trust Funnds for projeects ITS9821(001
1) and ITS-9
9921(001) to
o deploy and upgrade ITS
S componennts at the CG
GT facility. T
The
partnersh
hip agreemen
nts between the Federal Highway Addministrationn (FHWA) aand KYTC w
were
focused on
o improving traveler mobility
m
along
g the U.S. 255E corridor tthrough the Cumberlandd
Gap regio
on. These agreements provided
p
KY
YTC with funnding to deveelop an ITS regional
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architectu
ure, deploy and
a upgradee the necessaary ITS technnologies as iidentified in the regionall
architectu
ure, and evaluate those technologies
t
s.
The portiion of U.S. 25E
2 targeted
d for the ITS upgrade andd deploymennt covers appproximately 100
miles, ex
xtending from
m I-81 in Mo
orristown, Tennessee to Corbin, Kenntucky near II-75. This
corridor is
i listed as a High Prioriity Corridor in section 11105(c) of thee Intermodall Surface
Transporrtation Efficiiency Act (IS
STEA) (PL 102-240) as amended thhrough PL 1009-59. Bothh
Kentucky
y and Tennessee consideer the corrido
or a valuablee tourism areea, as there aare a numberr of
recreation
nal and histo
oric sites alo
ong the corrid
dor. Figure 2 shows thee corridor.

Figu
ure 2. U.S. 25E
E Corridor fro
om I-81 in Ten
nnessee to I-775 in
Kentuccky

A Techniical Advisorry Committeee (TAC) waas establishedd to provide general guiddance and
oversightt for the plan
nning of the CGT ITS deeployment. Members off the TAC inncluded
representtatives from the followin
ng:







Kentucky
K
Traansportation Cabinet (KY
YTC)
Tennessee
T
Deepartment off Transportattion (TDOT )
Federal Highw
way Adminiistration (FH
HWA)
Cumberland
C
Gap
G Nationaal Historical Park
Cumberland
C
Gap
G Tunnel Authority (C
CGTA)
Cumberland
C
Valley
V
Area Developmeent District

KYTC’s project man
nager served as the chairm
man of the ccommittee. The TAC prrovided
OT, and FHW
WA throughhout the courrse of the prooject.
recommeendations to KYTC, TDO
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2.3

Stakeholder Involvement

As with any ITS deployment, stakeholder involvement was critical. The federal aid projects that
funded the ITS deployment were high visibility earmarks with congressional involvement. This
deployment involved management decisions from two states (Kentucky and Tennessee) and a
national park. The planning process and installation of the CGT ITS components involved
procurement issues, system engineering, and technology standards. Installation of the CGT ITS
components took place on the National Park Service (NPS) property in the Cumberland Gap
National Historical Park and in two states along a corridor with Scenic Byway designation.
Congressional liaisons provided information on the legislative intent. This information provided
federal, state, and local decision-makers with the primary basis to develop the initial work plans.
Federal officials provided fundamental information concerning the earmark, the ITS partnership
agreement, and funding allocation.
Senior level state officials involved in this project included those inside KYTC and in Kentucky
state government. KYTC General Counsel provided review and advice concerning the ITS
partnership agreements and the bi-state agreement and was consulted on procurement issues.
Senior management within KYTC provided information on the various procedural steps and
documents required for FHWA programming.
Kentucky’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) provided an overview of the possible involvement
of the CIO’s office. The CIO was aware of ITS activities in Kentucky and was a strong
supporter of the use of advanced technologies and communications in transportation. The CIO
updated Kentucky’s Computing Architecture to allow for the systems and components that were
typically used in ITS deployments. The Cumberland Gap National Historical Park’s
superintendent and deputy provided advice and guidance concerning NPS regulations and
mandates. Senior TDOT officials were very supportive of KYTC’s efforts for the CGT. TDOT
officials provided the procedures for the approval agreements, permits and inspections, and for
processing payments.
The TAC continued to meet during the development of the planning documents. The TAC
recommended implementation of sections in the Strategic Plan. Senior management from both
states and the NPS decided on the systems and components to initially deploy. A local project
champion was identified who was familiar with the region and stakeholders and had a strong
desire for the project to succeed. This person also provided strong leadership for the project and
remained very active during this period, advising senior management in both states and the
NPS. The initial installation and upgrade was undertaken by FHWA’s Eastern Federal Lands
Highway Division (EFLHD).

2.4

Institutional Agreements

There were several legal agreements in place at the initiation of the regional architecture
development. In 1986, a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Department of the
Interior, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the State of Tennessee identified responsibilities
9

for CGT. This Memorandum of Understanding assigned responsibility for construction of CGT
to the EFLHD. The responsibility for the management and operations of the completed facility
was placed upon the states. A 1995 bi-state agreement established a bi-state oversight
committee and established Kentucky as the lead state to secure management and operations of
the CGT. In 1996, TMI was awarded a four year contract to manage and operate CGT.
In 1998 and 1999, KYTC and FHWA signed partnership agreements granting funds to KYTC
to develop an ITS regional architecture and other planning documents. These agreements also
provided funds to deploy ITS systems and components. In 1999, KYTC and TDOT agreed to
deploy ITS systems and components in both states and maintain them. In 2000 and 2001, TMI
was awarded contracts to continue managing and operating the CGT. Table 1 provides a
summary of the key agreements.
Existing agreements and new agreements solidified the NPS, Kentucky, and Tennessee in their
desire to see the deployment of technology at the Tunnel and along the U.S. 25 E corridor. The
use of agreements transcends senior leadership changes and enables project managers to
complete multi-year deployment without continual re-authorization.

10

Table 1. Legal Agreements
Legal Agreement
Date
Type

21-Feb-86

Memorandum
of
Understanding

Parties to the Agreement
First
Second
Third
U.S.
Department
of the
Interior/NPS

20-Jan-95

Bi-state
Agreement

Kentucky

6-Aug-96

Contract
Agreement

Kentucky

3-Oct-98

Partnership
Agreement

FHWA9821

29-Oct-99

Bi-state
Agreement

Kentucky

5-Nov-99

Partnership
Agreement

FHWA99211

1-Jul-00

Contract
Agreement

Kentucky

1-Jul-10

Contract
Agreement

Kentucky

Summary of Items
Included
*U.S. 25E is Federal
Highway
*EFLHD is responsible for
Kentucky construction of the CGT
Tennessee
*Management and
operations by Kentucky
and Tennessee
-States will produce a plan
*Kentucky lead state for
management of the Tunnel
Tennessee
*Oversight committee
established
*Third party contractor
Tunnel Management Inc.
responsible for operation
(Cumberland Gap Tunnel
and management of the
Authority)
Tunnel
*Traveler information
along U.S. 25E corridor
Kentucky
*Decrease response times
along the U.S. 25E corridor
*Kentucky lead state to run
the project
*Part of the work will be
Tennessee
done in Tennessee
*Tennessee will maintain
Tennessee components
*Traveler Information
along U.S. 25E corridor
Kentucky
Decrease response times
along the U.S. 25E corridor
*Third party contractor
Tunnel Management Inc. responsible for the
(Cumberland Gap Tunnel operation and management
of the Tunnel
Authority)
*Third party contractor
Tunnel Management Inc. responsible for the
(Cumberland Gap Tunnel operation and management
of the Tunnel
Authority)

11
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CHAPTER THREE: THE EVALUATION PLAN
The goals and objectives of the ITS deployment were established within the ITS Partnership
Agreement at the onset of the project. The parties involved agreed to work toward
accomplishing the following:
1) Provide updated traveler information to drivers in the vicinity of CGT and along the
U.S. 25E corridor;
2) Improve the integration of the tunnel systems; and
3) Improve incident detection, verification, and response times along U.S. 25E.
In addition, it was expected that the deployment of ITS infrastructure would have an impact on
at least some of the traditional ITS goal areas, such as:




3.1

traveler safety;
traveler mobility;
transportation system efficiency; and
conservation of energy and protection of the environment.
Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation was two-fold. First, this evaluation was intended to provide
documentation of the planning and installation of ITS components at CGT. This information is
summarized in Chapter 4. By going through the documentation process, which required
substantial interaction with stakeholders, lessons learned could be derived.
The second component of this evaluation was to determine how well the TAC and KYTC met
the goals of the CGT ITS deployment. In other words, did the deployment do what it was
intended to do? Also, did the deployment of ITS infrastructure have a positive impact on any of
the traditional ITS goal areas listed above? In consideration of the goals of the deployment and
the ITS goal areas, this evaluation focused on whether the ITS deployment met the following
objectives:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Provide Up-to-Date Traveler Information to Local and Regional Travelers
Improve Integration of the Tunnel Systems
Improve Incident Detection, Verification, and Response Times
Improve Traveler Safety
Improve Traveler Mobility
Improve Transportation System Efficiency
Conserve Energy and Protect the Environment

To accomplish these tasks the project team thoroughly reviewed the project documentation
provided by the project champion and project manager for CGT. Stakeholders were also asked
to provide input regarding the planning and deployment process. In addition, other types of
data, serving as measures of effectiveness, were collected and analyzed in an effort to evaluate
13

the benefits of the ITS deployment. Such data included: traffic volume, number of incidents,
number of hazardous material vehicles, and number of hazardous material vehicles escorted per
closure.
3.2

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were offered by the evaluation team based upon the project
documentation:
H1.
H2.

H3.
H4.

H5.

H6.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would facilitate
the passage of increased traffic through the tunnel corridor.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would improve
safety around the Tunnel by reducing rear end collisions during hazardous
material escorts.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would improve
the operations and maintenance procedures within the Tunnel.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would facilitate
an increase in the average number of hazardous material vehicle per escort
through the CGT.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would provide a
mechanism to enhance traffic and weather information to travelers in the
region surrounding CGT.
The implementation and integration of the ITS components would help
personnel to detect, verify, and respond to incidents in and around the
Tunnel more quickly.

14

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CUMBERLAND GAP TUNNEL REGIONAL ITS
DEPLOYMENT
This chapter documents the process of planning and implementation of the ITS infrastructure at
the CGT. Information for this chapter was collected from project documentation and
stakeholder interviews.
4.1

Planning Process

The ITS regional architecture was developed to serve as a blueprint or framework for the
various ITS systems and the interactions among them. KYTC and TDOT expressed a strong
interest in including a broad array of state and local stakeholders in the development of the ITS
regional architecture. KYTC designated a project manager who had experience in ITS
deployment. The TAC served as the core element of the stakeholder advisory group, and
various local, regional, and state level stakeholders were added.
The TAC also determined that a project champion would be integral to the overall success of
the development of the ITS regional architecture and the CGT ITS deployment. A project
champion would be instrumental in engaging other stakeholders for both the architecture
development and the ITS deployment. Lewis Melton, P.E., with Vaughn and Melton
Consulting Engineers, Inc., was identified as the project champion and ultimately served as the
information liaison among the TAC, the stakeholders, and the general public. TMI had a longterm contract through KYTC’s competitive bidding process to manage and operate the Tunnel,
and that work involved considerably more than just the ITS components. Mr. Melton had a
thorough understanding of the Tunnel, the local area, and the stakeholders. He helped to
maintain open lines of communication with the various stakeholders throughout the entire CGT
ITS deployment and provided much-needed institutional knowledge about the original planning
and construction of CGT. He was, of course, very knowledgeable concerning the management
and operation of the CGT.
In November of 1999, the project manager proceeded to procure a pre-qualified firm to develop
the Regional ITS Architecture and the Strategic and Integration Plans. The procurement was
carried out through provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 45A and Kentucky
Administrative Regulations (KAR) 600. A Professional Services Bulletin was prepared. Firms
were asked to respond to the bulletin indicating their approach to the project, their relevant
expertise, and their ability to complete the work in a timely manner. TRW, Inc., a pre-qualified
firm, was selected, and contract negotiations were initiated. While this method was successful,
the pace of the deployment was slowed considerably due to the change-order process and the
length of the procurement phase. TRW was officially under contract by July of 2001. This
delay in getting TRW in place resulted in some loss of interest in the deployment by the senior
management of KYTC and TDOT, as well as by local supporters.
The Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) at the University of Kentucky assisted TRW with
the stakeholder involvement and established a website to provide information to the
stakeholders and the public concerning the ITS planning for the deployment. Updates on the
architecture development process and other information were added periodically. This occurred
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between 2001 and 2003. This website provided an innovative method to disseminate
information quickly and economically. However, many of the stakeholders were not versed in
the use of the World Wide Web, so the effectiveness of the website was limited.
Over the course of several stakeholder workshops, local and regional ITS needs were identified.
The needed CGT ITS components were detailed, and an ITS regional architecture was defined.
The original ITS regional architecture was published in June 2002. The architecture was
consistent with the national ITS architecture and was reviewed and accepted by FHWA in
December 2002.
In addition to the ITS regional architecture, two other planning documents were developed. An
ITS strategic plan was generated to guide the deployment of the various CGT ITS technologies.
An ITS integration plan was also produced, as a companion to the ITS regional architecture, to
aid in the procurement and deployment of the various components. These documents were also
completed by TRW in June 2002. The costs associated with the planning process and
documents are shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Costs of the Planning Process and Documentation
ITS Planning Tasks
Deployment Planning, Stakeholder Involvement, Web Site Development
and Maintenance
ITS Regional Architecture, Strategic Plan, and Integration Plan
development
Total Planning Costs

$

Costs
103,183

$

715,753

$

818,936

Drawing from the planning documents, the project manager and the project champion
developed a schedule for deploying the various technologies and systems. Table 3, on the
following page, shows the planned deployment. As the project proceeded, some of the planned
tasks were not carried out for various reasons. In some cases, certain tasks were deemed to be
inappropriate or unnecessary.
4.2

Procurement of the ITS Equipment

The TAC held public meetings on several occasions in Middlesboro, KY to review the various
contracts and agreements integral to the CGT ITS deployment. One of the first tasks of the
TAC was to determine the contracting method to be followed for the deployment of the CGT
ITS components. Specifically, they discussed whether traditional consultant and low-bid
construction contracts would be used or whether alternative methods such as design/build or
system integrator could be used.
KYTC staff members were familiar with the management and implementation of ITS projects
because of their involvement with the traffic management center deployments in the Northern
Kentucky region and Louisville (ARTIMIS and TRIMARC). This past experience led KYTC
to pursue a single system integrator for the CGT ITS deployment.
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Table 3. Planned Deployment Schedule
Planned Task

Route/Location

CCTV (6 or more)
Road Weather Information Station
(RWIS) (2 or more)
Dynamic Message Sign (DMS) permanent (6 or more)
Highway Advisory Radio (6)
Radio Re-broadcast

Approaches to Tunnel
Around Tunnel and on I-75 near Jellico,
Tennessee
Tunnel Approaches and I-75 and I-81
Interchanges
U.S. 25E Corridor
Tunnel Control Center and
Speakers in Tunnel
Tunnel Control Center

Expansion of Tunnel Control
Center
Multiple Communication Devices
(prototype)
Hazardous Material Truck
Identification Monitoring System
(prototype)
Automatic Vehicle Location and
Computerized Dispatching

Anticipated
FY
Installation
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003

To be Determined by Stakeholders

2003

Tunnel Approaches

2003

Located on Regional Public Transit
Vehicles and Tunnel Control Center

2003

In 1998, Kentucky’s CIO implemented the Strategic Alliance Services (SAS) master contract.
KYTC reviewed the SAS administrative methods and regulations to consider if it could be
useful for the CGT project. After consulting the CIO’s staff, a Strategic Alliance Service
Request (SASR) was developed and proposed in the spring of 1999. The SASR was reviewed
and accepted by the CIO’s staff. Nevertheless, the CIO requested that KYTC withdraw the
SASR. The CIO indicated that while the use of a system integrator was appropriate under SAS,
she was concerned that the amount of hardware purchased by the system integrator would
exceed the limit allowed by law. The idea of using SAS was abandoned, and the project
manager proceeded to procure a consultant through the professional services procurement
process (as described in KRS 45A and KAR 600). A professional services bulletin was
prepared announcing that services were needed. A consultant was selected and placed under
contract to provide an ITS regional architecture, a strategic plan, and an integration plan for
CGT and the U.S. 25E corridor. While this method of procurement was successful, the pace of
the deployment was slowed considerably due to the time required for the procurement and for
change orders.
The project manager developed the necessary documentation for the programming staff to
advance the CGT ITS deployment funding through the various state and federal agencies. This
documentation was coordinated with both NPS and TDOT. Funds were programmed with
FHWA. The CGT ITS deployment was included in Kentucky’s Statewide Transportation
Improvement Program. Documentation was shared with the Kentucky Division of Air Quality,
the Kentucky Division of Water, and other groups interested the CGT ITS deployment project.
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4.3

ITS Upgrade and Deployment

The funding for the deployment of ITS technologies at CGT was used to (1) upgrade the
existing technologies operating in the Tunnel, (2) add additional technologies to expand local
and regional area coverage, and (3) ensure that all ITS technologies operating in the Tunnel and
the regional area were interoperable. Upgrading the original systems was necessary due to the
limitations of those technologies.
The installation of the CGT ITS systems and components took place between July of 2002 and
September of 2007. The timetable of the installations is outlined in Table 4 on page 19. Not all
planned elements were actually deployed. This was mainly due to some components being
deemed as not appropriate or not a priority after additional investigation.
ITS deployment at the CGT can be grouped into the following categories: (1) expansion and
upgrade of the CCTV System and upgrade of the multiplexer; (2) installation of the radio
rebroadcast system; (3) design and upgrade of the local DMS; (4) regional deployment of the
DMS and CCTV for I-75 and I-81; and (5) the upgrade of the Tunnel facility control room. The
costs associated with the deployment are shown in Table 5 on page 20.
Additional detail about the deployment and the expected benefits follows.
4.3.1 CCTV Upgrade and Expansion
The CCTV coverage was originally limited to the Tunnel area and a short distance beyond.
Additional coverage was needed beyond the facility to better improve control of traffic along
the corridor. The original CCTV multiplexor was an older model that had limited capacity.
Moreover, the cameras were several years old, and routine maintenance was proving
increasingly difficult.
A design was completed to replace the existing analog CCTV cameras with digital cameras
from an established manufacturer. Additional CCTV cameras were installed to assist with
management of the hazardous material vehicle escort system and to extend coverage to the U.S.
25E corridor. The upgraded system was intended to increase the incident detection and
verification range of the CGT operators. In addition, it allows operators to identify oncoming
hazardous material vehicles so that they may combine escorted vehicles. The new digital
cameras are rarely out of service and do not require as much maintenance as the previous analog
system.
In concert with the expansion and upgrade of the existing CCTV system, the existing CCTV
multiplexor was upgraded and a digital video recorder (DVR) was installed. The digital storage
provided verification for the various events occurring at the CGT for use by the CGTA and the
NPS.
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Table 4. Yearly ITS Deployment Summary
Fiscal Year
2002-2003

2003-2004

2004-2005














2005-2006





2006-2007
2007-2008







2008-2009










ITS Deployment Tasks and Milestones
Radio-rebroadcast system was installed
19 analog cameras replaced with digital cameras
Two additional cameras to view outbound hazardous material carriers
Install a digital video recorder with 320 gigabyte storage
21 digital cameras in operation
51,800 feet of fiber and power cable was added to network
Installed all wiring for DMS
Installed traffic control scenarios specific to CGTA
Installed 30 DMS, 2 changeable message signs (CMS), 12 variable
speed limit signs, 13 traffic signals, and 28 lane usage signs
Control room monitors 24 digital cameras
Addition of one security camera at the Tennessee equipment enclosure
Expansion of the emergency power circuits at DMS N-9 and N-10
CMS
Installed the DMS and CCTV cameras on I-75 near Corbin, KY
Control room now monitors 26 cameras
Expansion of emergency power circuits in Kentucky at DMS S-3 and
S-4, and a hazardous material truck lane CMS
Commissioned DMS on I-75
Installed DMS and CCTV cameras I-81 near Morristown, TN
Commissioned DMS on I-81
Improved DMS control system network and the message library
New video wall and console with 110” diagonal panel and two 67”
diagonal LCD panels
Two 45” diagonal LCD panels
Software upgrade to SCADA
Digital radio equipment upgrade for agency interoperability
New rebroadcast antennas
Established communication to I-81 DMS
Web-server upgrade for I-75 DMS
Installed new multiplexer upgrading storage to two terabytes
Installed digital radio upgrade for federal P-25 compliance and multiagency patch capability
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Table 5. Costs of the ITS Deployment
Components of the ITS Deployment
CCTV Upgrade and Expansion
CCTV Multiplexor
Radio Rebroadcast System
Planning and Design of Local DMS Upgrade and Expansion
Deployment of Local DMS Upgrade and Expansion
Design and Deployment of Regional DMS on I-75 near Corbin, KY
Design and Deployment of Regional DMS on I-81 near Morristown, TN
Planning, Design, and Deployment Upgrade and Expansion of CGT
Facility Control Room
Total Deployment Costs

Costs
$ 228,860
$ 34,159
$ 226,000
$ 50,696
$ 2,514,345
$ 734,450
$ 705,600
$ 383,973
$

4,878,083

4.3.2 Radio Rebroadcast System
The installation of a radio re-broadcast system was intended to be part of the original
construction of the CGT, but financial constraints prevented the project from being
implemented. Stakeholders identified the radio rebroadcast system as an important component,
and so it was included in the ITS upgrade. The voice/message override system added the
capability for TMI employees to communicate instructions to motorists during an emergency or
other events such as lane closures, bore closures, and adverse weather conditions.
The new digital radio equipment meets the public safety industry standard known as “P-25”. It
allows different agencies using different radio systems to communicate with each other. The
NPS and some mutual aid partners have transitioned to digital radio. CGTA is now compatible
with partnering agencies. With the radio rebroadcast system in place, CGTA has a greater range
for NPS dispatch and can patch together multiple agencies for emergency response
communications. CGTA thus expanded the radio range for NPS Ranger contact and dispatch
and has enhanced its ability to integrate multiple agencies for coordinated emergency response
communications.
4.3.3 Upgrade of Local DMS
There were several issues with the original message signs at the CGT. By 1999, the message
signs had become outdated, and basic repair modules were no longer available from the
manufacturer. Various other components of the message signs had to be repaired in-house
multiple times. A replacement for the message signs was needed. New signs were procured
from a stable modern vendor whose sales and operations included a wide range of customers.
This upgrade was intended to allow CGTA to more efficiently communicate real-time
information to drivers and more easily maintain the DMS.
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The new DMS system includes the following signs:






eight three-line signs on the approaches to the Tunnel
four two-line signs on the portal faces
fourteen one-line signs in the Tunnel
four one-line doubled faced signs in the Tunnel
two two-line signs in the hazardous materials lanes

Other associated technologies include:






12 variable speed limit signs
28 lane usage signs
13 traffic signals
Daktronics Vanguard NTCIP Compliant control software
22 digital cameras

4.3.4 Regional Deployment of DMS and CCTV
An expansion beyond the coverage area of the existing message signs was needed. A regional
DMS system would allow traveler information to be communicated to motorists on I-75 near
Corbin, Kentucky and I-81 near Morristown, Tennessee. These are locations where no regional
signage had previously existed. Additional DMS with CCTV cameras were deployed at four
locations in the area:


I-75 Northbound near mile 23.5



I-75 Southbound near mile 35.5



I-81 Northbound near mile 3



I-81 Southbound near mile 13.5

CGTA maintains all four signs and establishes a message on the DMS in Kentucky at the
request of the transportation operations center (TOC) in Frankfort. Messaging responsibilities
for the DMS in Tennessee are shared with the Knoxville Transportation Management Center.
CGT operators utilize the regional DMS to inform drivers of incidents or weather events of
interest to the travelling public.
The purpose of installing the additional CCTV cameras was to provide TMI operators with a
tool for monitoring the two major interstates near CGT. The purpose for installing the
additional DMS was to provide motorists with current regional travel information. Installation
of the new CCTV cameras required an upgrade of the technologies in the tunnel control room to
facilitate the monitoring of the additional cameras. A digital video recorder was needed to store
the incoming images. The original Traffic Surveillance Control Software (TSCS) contractor
was unable to upgrade the software to meet the requirements of the newer operating systems.
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Figure 4. CGT
C
Control Room Circa 2003
2
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CHAPTER FIVE: PROJECT OUTCOMES
This chapter presents the project outcomes based upon the objectives and hypotheses identified
in Chapter 3. Both quantitative and qualitative data are included in these findings.
5.1 Findings of the Deployment
The research team gathered feedback from the stakeholders and collected data to assess the
effectiveness of the CGT ITS components installed and to determine if the components installed
met the original goals set forth in the FHWA-KYTC partnership agreement.
5.1.1 Stakeholder Findings
According to the stakeholders, the ITS deployment accomplished several things. First, the
CCTV upgrade and expansion provided for additional information in the control room. The
south camera provided the ability to observe breaks in the traffic, which allowed operators to
stop traffic when there was a reduced chance for a rear-end collision. With the Cumberland
Avenue camera, the control room operators could see hazardous material trucks approaching,
and the operators could more easily escort two or more trucks at a time. The information from
the cameras helped to identify and verify incidents more quickly. As a result, incident response
was also improved. With the upgrade of the multiplexer, CGTA could store images and retrieve
video of incidents. These upgrades to the equipment also led to increased efficiency in
operations and maintenance, since there were fewer technical and integration problems.
The radio rebroadcast system served as an additional way to communicate with the public.
Although this method has been rarely used, it is extremely important to have this capability in
the event that motorists are stopped within the Tunnel. This component has improved traveler
information and traveler safety within the Tunnel. It allows Tunnel personnel the ability to
“patch” the radio systems of other emergency service providers in the area.
The upgrade of the local DMS has improved traveler information by allowing greater use of
each sign and the placement of additional signs. This upgrade has also led to increased
efficiency in operations and maintenance, since the newer technology has led to fewer technical
and integration problems. The new DMS also provided easier access for repair, preventing
CGTA from having to stop traffic for maintenance on the DMS.
Regional deployment of DMS and CCTV has improved traveler information within the region.
These signs and cameras are in critical locations to allow traffic to be detoured away from the
Tunnel if necessary. This deployment also provided critical regional traffic information to the
Control Room. Traveler information on the interstate highways can also be given through
messages on the signs.
The upgrade of the Control Room allowed operators to more efficiently and safely open and
close the Tunnel for hazardous material vehicle escorts. This is another instance where the
upgrades increased efficiency of operations and maintenance, since the newer technology led to
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fewer technical and integration problems. From the stakeholders’ view, it appears that the ITS
deployment served to meet several objectives as identified in Chapter 3:







Improved Traveler Information
Improved Integration of the Tunnel Systems
Improved Incident Detection, Verification, and Response Time
Improved Traveler Safety
Improved Traveler Mobility
Improved Transportation System Efficiency

5.1.2 Quantitative Indicators
Quantitative indicators were also used to assess the effects of the ITS components that were
installed. Stakeholders perceived that motorists’ safety would be improved by installing
detection, verification, and information systems in the vicinity of the CGT and along the U.S.
25E corridor. These systems operated by the CGTA would afford operators the ability to verify
incidents and provide the necessary information to travelers so they can make the best travel
decisions to avoid the incident. This would help to reduce traffic congestion and reduce the
likelihood of secondary crashes. The small number of crashes occurring in this vicinity makes
it difficult to make many conclusions about improvements to safety around the Tunnel.
However, looking at total crashes for four years before installation and upgrade of the ITS
began (1999-2002) and four years after (2003-2006), there are some significant findings.
Kentucky’s total crashes dropped from 86 to 49 and Tennessee’s dropped from 18 to 17. This is
a total decrease in crashes from 104 to 66. Table 6 below shows crash and traffic volume data
supplied by both TDOT and KYTC. The crashes are broken down into three categories:
property damage only (PDO), injury, and fatal.
Table 6. Crash and Volume Data Around CGT
Year

PDO

Injury

Fatal

Total

Volume

PDO

Kentucky Data

Injury

Fatal

Total

Volume

Tennessee Data

1999

12

9

0

21

2000

11

7

0

2001

18

3

2002

25

2003

Total

6

2

0

8

29

18

2

2

1

5

23

0

21

1

0

0

1

22

1

0

26

3

1

0

4

8

5

0

13

3

0

0

3

16

2004

12

1

0

13

1

3

0

4

17

2005

5

2

0

7

3

1

1

5

2006

13

3

0

16

3

2

0

5

21

2007

10

4

0

14

3

2

0

5

19

2008

13

1

0

14

20100

3

0

0

3

21543

17

23

1

0

24

21600

0

21117

24

2009

24100

Grand

24500

20000

Notes: Kentucky Crash Data for U.S. 25E from MP 0.00 to MP 1.8 in Bell County
Tennessee Crash Data for U.S. 25E from MP 19.30 to MP 20.96 in Claiborne County
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22736

22670

30
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Unfortunately, complete traffic volume records were not available, so there are several gaps in
the data. Volumes appear to decrease in both Kentucky and Tennessee over the period
presented in the table. CGTA personnel and NPS management believe there has been a
substantial increase in traffic volume since the Tunnel opened. They do not trust that the
available volume data is accurate. Therefore it is also difficult to make any conclusions using
the volume data.
Data does exist, however, on the number of hazardous material vehicles escorted through the
Tunnel. Hazardous material vehicles must receive a visual inspection and wait for the Tunnel to
be closed to public traffic so they can be escorted through the Tunnel. Very thorough records
are kept on these escorts through the Tunnel.
Table 7 reveals the rising use of the Tunnel by hazardous material vehicles. In the 2000-01
fiscal year, 24,708 hazardous material vehicles were escorted trough the Tunnel. The peak year
for such vehicle escorts was 2005-06, when 31,308 were escorted. The number of hazardous
material vehicles escorted has declined somewhat since then with 28,900 being escorted in
2007-08, the most recent year for which this information is available. The table also shows an
increase in the number of vehicles per escort. One of the specific objectives of tunnel
management was to escort more than one hazardous material vehicle at a time. The six years of
data show slow, consistent improvement over time. In 2000-01 the average number of vehicles
per escort was 1.27 and in 2007-08 the average number was 1.41. This is an increase of more
than 11%. This is an indication that tunnel operators are being more efficient about closing the
Tunnel for hazardous material escorts. This also has safety implications, since traffic is being
stopped more efficiently resulting in fewer opportunities for closure-related incidents. Lastly,
another indicator of the effectiveness of the CGT ITS systems is the low number of hazardous
material incidents. There have been no crashes involving hazardous material carriers in the
Tunnel area. Despite the increase in hazardous material vehicle traffic, the number of incidents
was five in fiscal year 2000-2001 and five in 2007-2008. The number has varied between two
and six over the six year period, with no indication of an increasing trend.
Table 7 also shows information on incidents around the Tunnel. An incident could be anything
from a serious accident, a suitcase falling off the roof of a car, or a motorist running out of gas.
The total number of incidents is provided by year, but also included are the number of
emergency incidents (with ambulance response), the number of motor vehicle emergency
incidents (including crashes), and other emergency incidents (which are mostly medical). The
data indicates that there was a significant increase in incidents from 2000-01 to 2007-08, more
than 70%. This data alone, however, does not help to make any conclusions about the
improvements in safety at the Tunnel. Without accurate volume data, it is difficult to say what
this incident data indicates. It could be an indication of decreased safety (which seems unlikely)
or it could be an indication of increased volumes of traffic at the Tunnel (which is expected
although not supported). The limited data on the specific types of incidents makes it very
difficult to make any conclusions based on this information.
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Table 7. Tunnel Statistics on Incidents and Hazardous Material Activities
Year

# of
Incidents

# of
Emergency
Incidents
(ambulance
response)

Motor
Vehicle
Emergency
Incidents
including
crashes

Other
Emergency
Incidents—
mostly
medical

HazMat
Vehicles
Escorted

# of
Vehicles
per
Escort

HazMat
Spills/
Incidents

20002001
20012002
20022003
20032004
20042005
20052006
20062007
20072008

718

20

15

5

24,708

1.27

5

760

24

14

10

28,804

1.27

6

866

20

9

11

27,555

1.27

2

1199

27

25

2

27,872

1.28

2

1205

27

19

8

30,435

1.36

5

1208

25

21

4

31,308

1.35

3

1147

35

24

11

30,985

1.39

3

1230

23

19

4

28,900

1.41

5

From the quantitative data that was examined as part of this evaluation, it appears that the ITS
deployment served to meet the following objectives:
 Improved Traveler Safety
 Improved Traveler Mobility
 Improved Transportation System Efficiency
5.1.3 Evaluation of Hypotheses
All of the identified hypotheses for this study were evaluated based on input from the
stakeholders and analysis of available data. The following summary identifies each hypothesis
as true, partially true, false, or undetermined. Also included for each hypothesis is evidence to
support the finding.
H1.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would facilitate the
passage of increased traffic through the Tunnel corridor.
PARTIALLY TRUE. There was insufficient data to determine if traffic volume
increased through the Tunnel. However, the hazardous material records did reflect
increases in the number of hazardous material escorts through the Tunnel.

H2.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would improve
safety around the Tunnel by reducing rear end collisions during hazardous
material escorts.
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PARTIALLY TRUE. There were no records on the number of rear end collisions at
the Tunnel. However, there was a substantial drop in the total number of crashes in
the vicinity of the Tunnel. Also Tunnel operators reported an increase in safety with
the ability to monitor traffic more closely using the CCTV and to select optimal times
to stop traffic.
H3.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would improve the
operations and maintenance procedures within the Tunnel.
TRUE. There were several updates that allowed for improved efficiency in
operations and maintenance. The multiplexer allowed for more storage of images and
the ability to retrieve video. The radio rebroadcast system gave operators the ability
to communicate with motorists within the Tunnel. New and additional DMS and
CCTV helped to expand coverage. The new DMS were also easier to access for
maintenance and eliminated the need to stop traffic for maintenance to be performed.
In general, the newer technology led to fewer technical and integration problems as
well.

H4.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would facilitate an
increase in the average number of hazardous material vehicles per escort
through the CGT.
TRUE. Data on hazardous material escorts showed that there has been a slow, but
steady increase in the number of hazardous material vehicles escorted per closure. In
2000-01 the average number of vehicles per escort was 1.27 and in 2007-08 the
average number was 1.41.

H5.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would provide a
mechanism to enhance traffic and weather information to travelers in the region
surrounding CGT.
PARTIALLY TRUE. The installation of DMS on I-81 and I-75 has enhanced
traveler information in the region. The signs and cameras are in critical locations that
allow traffic to be detoured away from the Tunnel if necessary. Previously, there was
no effective way to detour traffic around the Tunnel. There have been no
enhancements to weather information as a result of this project.

H6.

The implementation and integration of the ITS components would help
personnel to detect, verify, and respond to incidents in and around the Tunnel
more quickly.
TRUE. Although the time to identify, verify, and respond to incidents is not
recorded by CGT, the operators do believe that the added camera coverage has
greatly enhanced their ability to detect and verify an incident. This also allows the
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operators to request assistance from responders more quickly and should decrease
response time.
5.2 Technical and Institutional Issues
This section identifies stumbling blocks and describes the steps taken to avoid or overcome
them. This was a complex ITS deployment involving many partners and stakeholders as well as
the integration of several new technologies. The following technical and institutional obstacles
were identified.
5.2.1 Lack of Expertise
ITS deployments were relatively new in 1998, and KYTC did not have sufficient staff to
develop a Regional ITS Architecture for the Cumberland Gap Tunnel area. Although the
Project Manager was familiar with the National ITS Architecture and was experienced in the
development of ITS Regional Architectures for two Traffic Management Centers, outside
expertise was needed.
5.2.2 Difficult and Lengthy Procurement Process
The Project Manager procured a pre-qualified firm to develop the Regional ITS Architecture,
the Strategic Plan for the corridor, and the Integration plan for the field deployment. This was
done through provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 45A and Kentucky
Administrative Regulations (KAR) 600. The project manager prepared a Professional Services
Bulletin to announce the need for ITS services.
A pre-qualified firm with the requisite expertise (TRW) was selected and placed under contract.
While this method was successful, the pace of the deployment was slowed considerably due to
the length of the procurement process. The Architecture and Strategic and Integration Plans
took one year to complete after the consultant was authorized to start.
The process took two years and created concerns for senior management and the local project
champion. As a result of this delay, some stakeholders lost interest in the project. Kentucky’s
concerns with the institutional issues regarding the procurement of ITS technologies were
reported in a 2007 analysis of Kentucky’s procurement processes. (3)
5.2.3 Lack of Traffic Count Data
An issue that presented itself in the course of this evaluation was the lack of accurate continuous
traffic count data at the Tunnel. Such data was needed to gain a more precise estimate of the
impact of ITS on traffic management and safety. Had the Project Manager foreseen the impact,
automated count and classification stations could have been installed early on in the
deployment.
Both Kentucky and Tennessee lack a continuous traffic counting system near the CGT. Staff at
the CGT believe the traffic volumes are much higher than the volumes reported by the
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respective state agencies. Continuous traffic counting systems could be installed in Kentucky
and Tennessee with remaining funds in order to provide data for future decisions.
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CHAPTER SIX: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter describes the lessons learned from the ITS deployment at the CGT. The ITS
deployment for the CGT and U.S. 25E corridor was a successful demonstration of the
usefulness of ITS technologies. The following are some of the key lessons learned from this
ITS deployment and also serve as recommendations for future deployment:


Engage Stakeholders – Local and regional stakeholders were engaged early and made
significant contributions during the planning process. This input was foundational for
the project and resulted in the implementation of a well-received, valuable project for
the region. Identification and engagement of stakeholders should be an early activity for
all ITS projects.



Identify a Project Champion - A local project champion was identified who was
committed to seeing the project succeed. The project champion was instrumental in
engaging stakeholders and communicating with them throughout the deployment. He
had a thorough understanding of the CGT region and project and was a valuable
resource.



Plan for the Project – Proper planning for an ITS project is critical. Sufficient funding
was set aside for the planning and architecture development for the CGT project. This
allowed the project team to incorporate input from the stakeholders and have a clear goal
for the deployment. However, thought should have also be give to performance
measures. How will the success of the project be measured and what tools need to be in
place to measure that performance? Traffic count systems at the Tunnel would have
been helpful in measuring the volume of traffic accommodated by the ITS deployment.
Future ITS deployments should start with good planning and identification of
performance measures.



Establish Institutional Agreements - Formal partnership agreements should be
established early in the project. This helps to ensure that even when key agencies
experience leadership changes, there is still commitment to the project.



Find Expertise Within – A project manager who has had significant experience with
ITS should be chosen for the deployment. The planning, procurement, and deployment
of ITS can be lengthy and complicated. Having a project manager with prior experience
with ITS deployments can make the process proceed more quickly and smoothly.



Find Expertise Outside - When the expertise for the project (or some component of the
project) is not available in-house, the needed expertise should be obtained from
consultants or other outside organizations. An expert consultant was hired to develop
the ITS Regional Architecture, Strategic Plan, and Integration Plan. This was an area
where KYTC did not have the necessary expertise in house. This was a critical part of
the planning process for the project.
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Prepare for a Lengthy Procurement Process - The procurement process for an ITS
deployment project can be difficult and lengthy. Delays in this process can reduce
stakeholder interest for the project. Prepare stakeholders for a lengthy procurement, and
investigate procurement options at the start of the project.



Utilize a System Integrator for the Duration of the Project - The ability to work with
a single system integrator over the life of the CGT ITS deployment was an important
aspect of the project’s success. The use of a system integrator can help to ensure that
accountability rests with a single firm and with that firm’s subcontractors.

One recommendation specific to the Tunnel is the implementation of traffic count systems.
This would allow stakeholders to measure the flow of traffic through and around the Tunnel and
would provide valuable data to the stakeholders.
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY
Bi-State Agreement - The supplement agreement between KYTC and TDOT spelling out each
state’s responsibilities with the ITS deployment.
CCTV - Closed-circuit television: a video camera system designed for monitoring highway
traffic.
CGT - The Cumberland Gap Tunnel: a twin-bore tunnel through the Cumberland Gap National
Historical Park’s Cumberland Mountains.
CGTA - Cumberland Gap Tunnel Authority: the public face name of the company that manages
the CGT.
CIO - Chief Information Officer: Kentucky state government’s senior technology and
communications officer
CRT - Cathode Ray Tube: a vacuum tube video technology developed in the early 1920s that
provides a crisp bright display. CRTs are generally large, heavy, and cube-like.
DMS - Dynamic Message Sign: an electronic highway traffic sign providing traveler
information to motorists. The DMS may be stationary or portable and may be a part of a system
of signs.
DVR - Digital Video Recorder: an electronic device that records images in digital form from
multiple CCTV cameras used for detection and documentation.
EFLHD - Eastern Federal Lands Highway Division: The Eastern Federal Lands Highway
Division part of the Federal Lands Highway Program of FHWA administered the construction
of the Cumberland Gap Tunnel construction.
ESS - Environmental Sensor Station: a roadway location consisting of one or more sensors
measuring atmospheric, pavement, soil, or hydrologic conditions.
FHWA - The Federal Highway Administration: the national level transportation agency
administering federal Highway Trust Funds.
FHWA, Kentucky Division - The local office in Kentucky for FHWA administering federal
Highway Trust Funds.
HAR - Highway Advisory Radio: a licensed low-power radio station to provide traveler
information to motorists.
HazMat - Hazardous Material: materials or goods in various forms capable of causing ill health
effects and/or damage to property.
ISTEA - Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act: a 1991 US federal law which
instituted an intermodal approach to transit/highway funding.
ITS - Intelligent Transportation Systems: the use of modern communications and technology to
solve transportation problems.
ITS Partnership Agreement - A supplemental agreement to award a grant of Federal
assistance to KYTC for the specific ITS activities authorized by TEA21.
KTC - Kentucky Transportation Center: a grant-funded transportation research organization
which operates through the University of Kentucky in Lexington, Kentucky.
KYTC - The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet: the state level transportation agency in
Kentucky.
LCD - Liquid Crystal Display: an electronic video technology, using liquid crystals, that
provides a clearer and brighter display that is lightweight and has low power consumption.
NGC - Northup Grumman Corporation: the consulting firm that bought out TRW and finished
plans for the deployment.
37

NPS - The National Park Service: the agency of the US Department of the Interior responsible
for the national parks.
Project Champion - A regional stakeholder with a vested interest in the outcome of the
deployment.
Project Manager - The KYTC engineer assigned to coordinate/administer the ITS deployment
associated with the two agreements.
PS&E - Plans, Specifications, and Estimate: the various documents prepared by an engineer
that provide the construction plans, the material specifications, and the estimated cost to deploy
the project.
RITA - Research and Innovative Technology Administration: the agency of the US Department
of Transportation that coordinates research programs including ITS research and evaluation.
RWIS - Road Weather Information Station: an ESS in the field near a roadway, designed to
gather and transmit weather and roadway status to a central source.
SAC - Study Advisory Committee: the committee formed to advise and guide the research
team.
SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition: the software that monitors and controls
many of the tunnel facility’s power, environmental, and access systems.
TAC - Technical Advisory Committee: a working group established to provide general
guidance and oversight to the ITS deployment.
TDOT - The Tennessee Department of Transportation: the state level transportation agency in
Tennessee.
TEA-21 - The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century: enacted June 9, 1998 as Public
Law 15-178 authorizing the Federal surface transportation programs for highways, highway
safety, and transit for the 6-year period 1998-2003.
TMI - Tunnel Management, Inc.: the firm holding the contract for managing the tunnel
operations.
TRW - Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc.: the consulting firm that developed the ITS Regional
Architecture for the CGT area.
TSCS - Traffic Surveillance Control System: software that coordinates the deployment of
messages on the DMS.
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